Discussions on akrasia (lack of regulate, or weak spot of will) in Greek philosophy were particularily vibrant and extreme for the earlier 20 years. normal tales that provided Socrates because the thinker who easily denied the phenomenon, and Plato and Aristotle as rehabilitating it straightforwardly opposed to Socrates, were challenged in lots of alternative ways. development on these demanding situations, this collective presents new, and on occasion adversarial methods of examining recognized in addition to extra overlooked texts. Its thirteen contributions, written by way of specialists within the box, disguise the full heritage of Greek ethics, from Socrates to Plotinus, via Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Epictetus).
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Additional resources for Akrasia in Greek Philosophy. From Socrates to Plotinus
8. 11 Or, alternatively and more generally, dismissed as unworthy of a good philosopher like Plato. For a slightly more extended treatment of the issues here, see Rowe (2003b). e. in the course of arguing for the existence of three parts of the soul, one rational and two irrational, the irrational parts (respectively ‘spirited’ and ‘appetitive’) themselves being capable of causing the agent to act even contrary to reason. Such actions are ruled out by the ‘intellectualist’ model, according to which all desires are for the (real) good, and the only difference between agents who get things wrong and those who get things right is in the state of their beliefs.
Nonrational desire need not enter the explanatory picture. But before we accept the traditionalist’s understanding of Socrates’ position, we would do well to take a closer look at just what endows an object with the power of appearance. As we have seen, the clear suggestion of Socrates’ account of how the craft of measurement saves us is that proximity to the agent plays a crucial role in the explanation. 8 thomas c. brickhouse and nicholas d. smith Socrates’ examples—size, depth, number and sounds (Protagoras 356c5–8)— certainly lead one to think that the sort of proximity he has in mind is spatial proximity.
E. in the course of arguing for the existence of three parts of the soul, one rational and two irrational, the irrational parts (respectively ‘spirited’ and ‘appetitive’) themselves being capable of causing the agent to act even contrary to reason. Such actions are ruled out by the ‘intellectualist’ model, according to which all desires are for the (real) good, and the only difference between agents who get things wrong and those who get things right is in the state of their beliefs. See below, esp.